This paper discusses the fundamentals of architecting a major human spaceflight program and some of the lessons that can be learned from NASA's Constellation Program. This paper describes the Constellation program, whose primary objective focuses on development of a new generation of vehicles and systems to enable human exploration beyond Earth orbit. Constellation is made up of seven projects that are highly interdependent and is referred to in the NASA management system as a "tightly coupled" program. This paper will discuss the driving architectural priorities and characteristics for human exploration missions beyond earth orbit and how its building blocks are developed through initial capability missions to the International Space Station. The systems engineering challenges of simultaneously defining and developing systems that are interdependent will be discussed.
INTRODUCTION
The Constellation Program was proposed for termination by the Administration in their FY11 budget submittal to the Congress. At the time of this writing, elements of the Constellation Program are part of proposed Congressional appropriations language and efforts to develop a new human spaceflight architecture are underway. While Constellation may not continue by that name, many of the architectural lessons and principles as well as design and technology maturation are likely to find their way into the human spaceflight architecture that emerges.
Constellation is developing new space vehicles and support systems which would allow continued American access to low Earth orbit following the retirement of the Space Shuttle. The program would also enable humans to return to the Moon to conduct extended exploration, establish a planetary outpost on the lunar surface and prepare for crewed missions to Mars. The Constellation Program has been phased as a stepwise capability build-up largely based upon Space Shuttle heritage components. [1] To understand Constellation one needs to think in terms of two broad definitions. The first comes from NASA's Program and Project Management Guidelines, NASA 7120.5D, which defines Constellation as a "tightly coupled" program. Specifically that definition is a: "Program with multiple projects that execute portions of a mission or missions, in which no single project is capable of implementing a complete mission."
Constellation also meets the definition of a complex "systemof-systems." It is a concurrent development of distributed, independent (in development, management, and sometimes operations) yet interdependent systems whose components are complex systems themselves. It is a system in which emergent, interactive and evolutionary behaviors can and often do show up that are not be apparent or discoverable from understanding and/or managing the parts. In addition to the technical elements, technology, policy (politics), and economics are primary contributors to the complexity and implementation challenges.
The development, content and current status of the Constellation architecture derives from specific milestones. These milestones include cataclysmic, technical and political events. The foundations of CxP begin with the Columbia accident on February 1, 2003 . This event and the detailed report of its causes directly influenced many of the developers and implementers of the CxP system architecture. The program is designed with two complementary implementation phases, initial and lunar. The Initial Capability (IC) phase comprises elements necessary to support the International Space Station by 2015 with crew rotations, and includes the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle, the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle, the first configuration of a new modular spacesuit, and major new implementations of the supporting ground and mission infrastructure to enable these missions. The Constellation Lunar Capability (LC) builds upon the IC; adding the Ares V heavy lift Cargo Launch Vehicle, the Altair lunar lander, the second configuration of the new spacesuit designed for lunar surface operations and a major new mobile launch platform for the Ares V. Lunar outpost elements and capabilities will follow, including permanent and mobile habitats, rover vehicles, power and communication elements to support a sustained exploration presence from weeks to 6 months. In addition, equipment to perfect in-situ lunar resource extraction and processing techniques (e.g., on-site production of oxygen, propellants, construction materials, etc.) will be developed. In-situ resource utilization is expected to become a cornerstone technology in the human exploration of Mars and other destinations within our solar system.
WHAT IS ARCHITECTURE
There is an evolving understanding of the meaning, nature and application of architecting in the broad discipline of aerospace systems engineering. Drawing from the IEEE Std 1471-2000, as applied to avionics and software systems, a working definition of architecture is that it is: the fundamental organization of a system, embodied in its components, their relationships to each other and the environment and the principles governing its design and evolution. The system in this case is the entire set of flight and ground hardware/software and all the constituent elements, organizations and stakeholders. It is also critical to consider in any system architecture both technical and programmatic constraints and drivers.
Architecture tells why a system is the way it is and how this understanding of the system is to be sustained. Architecture provides guidance as design progresses, its value is in its stability and attention to fundamentals. A sound and robust architecture ensures system integrity. A key aspect of the "goodness" or success of an architecture is its ability to engender designs that meet objectives and satisfy stakeholders over time. This is particularly true for human spaceflight programs that are developed and operated over decades where integrity must be maintained well into the development to assure success.
Architecting links management and systems engineering. It links key stakeholders within a project team and provides the guidance for a unifying the technical and programmatic baseline and its implementation. The architecture must also address the objectives of all the stakeholders, some who may have different or even conflicting priorities. Stakeholders will likely share common mission objectives but may have very different views of success criteria and implementation approaches including programmatic constraints, development strategy, and risk management. Stakeholders from outside the project/program are distinguished by the fact that they have something to gain or lose by virtue of the actions of project/ program. It is vital recognize all significant stakeholders.
Fundamental principles are integral to an architecture and guide the design. In engineering, the fundamental principles are the laws of nature and proven designs. In architecture the principles often take the form of heuristics, i.e. commonsense rules. Principles foster order, structure, and elegance. Principles are the basis for architectural integrity and they need to be well crafted, documented and owned by the team. A good principle is generally well substantiated, clear about applicability and application, without qualifications or exceptions, relatively easy to explain, and the last thing you're willing to give up. Rules of thumb, prescriptive statements, and requirements are usually not good principles. They are a statement of what you really care about.
Architecture ensures that development can progress smoothly by identifying and applying carefully considered principles, rules, and patterns of good design. It establishes workable perimeters within which more detailed decisions can be made with assurance that overall system integrity is maintained. Fundamentally it explains why a system is what it is.
Designs are often confused with architecture. A design is the embodiment of an architecture. Designs address what is to be built and how. Architecture is not a broad brush effort confined to early development. Architecture dictates what possibilities are allowed, while still remaining faithful to stable concepts selected to fulfill system objectives. Architecture is not pictures, block diagrams, lists, or other schematic representations of the design. Architecture focuses on a full accounting of the structure, properties, and models that represent essential characteristics of the system and its environment. Architecture is not requirements. Architecture provides the rationale for requirements, as well as the criteria for allocating requirements and flowing them from one level to the next. Architecture is not fickle, or subject to routine refinement, it provides a stabilizing influence through its well-considered form, expectations, rules, and attention to fundamentals.
ARCHITECTURE DESCRIPTION
To understand the Constellation architecture one needs to understand the principles that are its foundation. They are derived from many sources and stakeholders including the Columbia Accident Report. While not published officially as such the authors believe the following are the core principles of Constellation.
1. "Give overriding priority to crew safety, rather than trade safety against other performance criteria, such as low cost and reusability" 
10.
Minimize lifecycle costs for sustainability based on appropriate, stable funding The components that implement the Constellation architecture as defined by ESAS are seven projects. They are the Orion (CEV), Ares (Ares I and V), Extravehicular Activity (EVA), Ground Systems, Mission Systems, Altair (lunar lander) and the Lunar Surface Systems (see Figure 1) . The transportation architecture for missions to the moon is shown in Figure 2 . This architecture follows the basic Apollo approach with the significant difference of using two launches to deliver the needed payload and crew to achieve the Constellation program objectives.
The cornerstone of the Constellation human space exploration strategy is the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle.
The Orion spacecraft consists of the Crew Module, Service Module, Spacecraft Adapter, and Launch Abort System (see Figure 3 ). While reminiscent of the Apollo Command Module (due to the physics associated with atmospheric entry, the overall shape of the Crew Module is similar to that of the Apollo Command Module), the Orion Crew Module is much larger, providing more than twice the usable interior volume and nominally carrying a crew of four, its size is sufficient to carry a crew of six. New features of the Orion spacecraft include a digital "glass cockpit" control system, derived conceptually from the systems used in today's most advanced aircraft, and the use of high-data-rate, low-weight fiber optic systems. The spacecraft will be able to "autodock" with the ISS using onboard sensors and computers, with provision for the crew to take over in an emergency. Previous American spacecraft (Gemini, Apollo, and Shuttle) have all required manual piloting for docking. The final interior layout of the Crew Module is still being designed, but current ergonomic evaluation and crew area layout is shown in Figure 4 .
The primary landing mode for the Crew Module will be an ocean landing near the western U.S. coast supported by parachutes and inflatable water flotation airbags; however, contingency landing and recovery of the crew and capsule will be possible anywhere in the world. Current planning is focusing on a nominal water landing within 200 miles of the Navy's San Clemente Island Range Complex, using a local retrieval ship with helicopter support and cost-sharing of a Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle with the Navy and Military Sealift Command. After recovery, various components of the Crew Module will be refurbished and reflown. Hardware associated with the Launch Abort System, Service Module, and Spacecraft Adapter is jettisoned at various points during the flight and either disintegrates during atmospheric reentry or is targeted for impact in a remote ocean location. The Altair lunar lander will provide access to the lunar surface for astronaut crews and/or cargo via a descent stage and will return the crew via an ascent stage to the Orion spacecraft in lunar orbit. A cargo-only version of the lunar lander will be able to transport cargo to the lunar surface and may not include an ascent stage. Basic elements of the lunar lander will include the propellant tanks and engines associated with the ascent/descent stages, a living module for the crew (i.e., pressure vessel), a landing gear system, internal power supplies (e.g., rechargeable batteries) and provisions for crew access to the lunar surface. Propellants proposed for the lunar lander include cryogenic liquidoxygen/liquid hydrogen for the descent stage and hypergolic N2O4/ Aerozine 50 used in an AJ-10 rocket engine for the ascent stage. The AJ-10 is the same engine used for the Orion main engine. Later versions of the Altair module may serve as a testbed for methane-based engines which could use in-situ resources found on Moon for fuel production. As part of the Lunar Capability phase of the Constellation program, the Altair project is currently in the initial stage of requirements development and will not select a preliminary design until the 2012-2013 timeframe. Figure 7 shows a conceptual illustration of the Altair lunar lander.
ARCHITECTURE TECHNICAL PRIORITIES
The highest architectural priority for any human spaceflight mission is crew safety. Crew safety is built on a foundation of a number of architectural elements including proven, heritage-based hardware with successful human flight history. For CxP this includes the Ares I first stage a direct derivative of the Shuttle solid rocket boosters and the Ares I upper stage J-2X engine based on the Apollo J-2S engine. Next to high inherent reliability hardware, the capability to be able to abort due to a catastrophic event and return the crew safely to earth, during any part of the launch phase, is critical. The CxP architecture provides abort capability at all times from pre-ignition to orbit. The Launch Abort System (LAS) is a separate subsystem and is available from pre-liftoff throughout first stage flight and up until shortly after upper stage engine ignition. In particular it provides aborts capability during high-aerodynamic load regimes such as transonic and max-dynamic pressure phases. The CEV provides abort capability after the launch abort system (LAS) jettison with its own propulsion system.
Human spaceflight programs make extensive use of probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). This technique is used to calculate probabilities of loss of crew (LOC) and loss of mission (LOM). The LOC/LOM calculations are done by mission phase for the individual and integrated vehicles. The analysis of LOC and LOM are used to make design decisions throughout the program with the overall intent to provide significantly better safety than Space Shuttle. The current ascent LOC estimates from the Space Shuttle Program is one loss of crew event in 160-270 flights. The current estimate for Ares I/Orion is one ascent loss of crew every 2,850 flights.
CxP is NASA's first program to be certified as "humanrated." This means that all the flight elements and the operations will be compliant with Human Ratings Requirements Policy, NASA 8705.2B. This policy was first established after the development of the Shuttle and was recently updated for Constellation. In the update for CxP the most significant change was to change the catastrophic failure tolerance requirement from being tolerant to 2 failures to being tolerate to at least 1 failure. This change was driven by the necessities of performance and put significant additional responsibilities on the engineering teams to show they had the safest possible designs within the constraints of the program.
One of the characteristics of spaceflight that makes it particularly challenging, and has parallels to the automotive industry, is the problem of mass and most specifically the ability to safely and efficiently accelerate and decelerate mass. However, for spaceflight we are working directly against gravity and must achieve very high velocities (e.g. earth escape velocity is 11.2 km/s or ∼25,000 mph) to get where we want to go. Then we need to decelerate into another gravity field (e.g. the moon or Mars) and then accelerate back out to return to Earth and finally decelerate back down to the surface of the Earth. Needless to say this is what makes spaceflight so complex and energy intensive. In order to simplify the understanding of the performance impacts of spaceflight we talk in term of what we call "gear ratios." A gear ratio is the multiplier times every unit of mass we want to deliver somewhere (e.g. crew or payload) that accounts for all the other things, propellant, and non-propellant (e.g. tanks, heat shields, etc) needed for a particular phase of the mission. Just to get to low earth orbit the gear ratio for just propellant is about 20 to 1. But to an architectural element that must travel from earth orbit to the moon and back to the surface of earth (e.g. the CEV) the gear ratio is 9 to 1. For those elements that we want to deliver to the surface of the moon and return to the surface of the Earth (e.g. the crew) the gear ratio is 19 to 1. Figure 8 shows a more complete set of gear ratios for lunar missions.
Given these gear ratios the ability to get a lot of mass into orbit is a major architectural driver. You have the options of one (or two) very large rockets referred to as heavy lift or a few (or many) moderate to small lift rockets. However, there is guiding principle, driven by overall reliability, to minimize the number of launches. The probably of mission success starts to drop dramatically if more than 2 launches are required to accomplish a mission. The factors that contribute to this significant drop in mission success include individual reliability of the vehicles, the ability to launch more than one vehicle in a finite launch period (including the effects of weather and landing sea states), the ability to maintain cryogenic propellants in space, and the complexity of onorbit operations with multiple vehicles.
Current estimates for lunar missions require the equivalent of ∼200 t of mass in low earth orbit (LEO) which can be done with an Ares I and Ares V launch. For a Mars mission the mass in LEO would be in the 375-625 t range, in a higher, stable high earth orbit, which is likely to need about 6 Ares V launches. In addition, there are certain payload elements for which a single launch of at least 125 t is likely to be needed.
Mass is not the only driving performance parameter, volume is also critical. For a variety of reasons, very large payload diameters are expected to be needed. For lunar missions a payload diameter of 8 m to 10 m is needed. For Mars missions greater than 10 m diameters plus heights above 22 m are anticipated.
So how do you technically manage a complex, interdependent and evolving system of systems, in a word: margins. The need to establish and manage technical resource margins across all flight elements and all mission phases is essential. These include margins for a diverse range of resources including, mass, power, computer throughput, memory, communications bandwidth, temperature control, loads, etc. There is a set of resource margins that systems engineering establishes and manages for every flight element and for the integrated systems. The program has developed stochastic methods for analyzing margins across these multistaged systems, particularly for mass and performance.
ARCHITECTURE PROGRAMMATIC PRIORITIES
There is an old saying around NASA -"we can lick gravity, but the paperwork has us stymied." Rocket science is not easy, but few NASA projects fail due to the difficulties of rocket science. By far, more NASA projects are cancelled before flight due to cost growth or schedule slippage than fail during a mission. The establishment of a technical solution to perform a human or robotic mission is the first important step toward accomplishment of the mission, but must be accompanied by an equally enlightened programmatic solution that enables realization of the technical solution in finite, predictable time and money. Projects such as the Manhattan Project or the Apollo Program, accompanied by a blank check, are the exception rather than the norm. Furthermore, the development environment is dynamic, not static; for instance, vendors go out of business, technology advances render design approaches obsolete, and customer needs and desires change. The longer the timeframe needed for a system development, the more likely that some external factor will significantly impact the development effort. This is not uniquely a US Government or even NASA phenomenon; Motorola's Iridium program is a textbook example of a large corporate program done in by technology advancement in the cellular market rendering satellite telephones obsolete in the eyes of most customers. Since most NASA system developments require 3-5 years duration, and human spaceflight systems even longer, they are prone to encounter disruptive changes in the development environment.
In the case of the Constellation Program, the development effort was planned for seven years to achieve Initial Capability, then an additional five years to achieve Lunar Capability. Several technical challenges, perhaps most noteworthy thrust oscillation, emerged and were summarily addressed and resolved. The system engineering foundation provided by the ESAS, and matured within the constraints of well considered margin management proved robust, allowing technical risks to be solved without breaking the architecture. The successful Ares 1-X flight test demonstrated the fundamental flight characteristics of the Ares I launch vehicle. The technical solution that was the Constellation architecture was progressing quite nicely through development.
Conversely, the programmatic solution did not prove so robust. The budget profile on which the schedule was based never quite materialized year to year, which stretched the development schedule. Still, the Constellation Program remained on track for achieving Initial Capability on schedule, albeit at higher risk because schedule margin had been consumed. For NASA, the programmatic solution also includes the political support for a given project or program. There too the programmatic solution was carefully crafted, and Congressional authorizations for NASA in 2005 and 2008 including the Constellation Program enjoyed strong bipartisan support. However, only four years into the system development the Constellation Program was proposed to be cancelled when the Human Spaceflight Policy was changed by a new Presidential Administration. In the end, the Constellation architecture was proposed for cancellation not due to technical problems but due to foreseeable funding problems, limited schedule flexibility, and ultimately to the change in priorities of a primary stakeholder. So long as complex systems take many years to complete, even carefully and robustly designed Programs are susceptible to changes in their development environment over which they can exercise little or no control.
The Constellation architecture was vulnerable because it could not achieve significant results in a short enough time. The program's focus on life-cycle cost, rather than maximizing results on an annual funding basis was its Achilles heel. The programmatic approach was a dozen years of overlapping system developments with no clear interim stopping points. Projects and programs that span Administrations are susceptible to dramatic policy changes. If one could recycle the clock to Constellation's early planning on the heels on the ESAS, a more robust programmatic approach might have been to focus on significant accomplishments which could be achieved in five years maximum, in turn followed by another 4-5 year development that achieved the next increment of capability, and so on in successive cycles of approximately 4-5 years. NASA must learn a lesson that the automotive industry has already learned -shortening the development cycle is key to successful system developments.
SUMMARY/CONCLUSIONS
As space systems have become more complex the need for effective architecting has become essential. Early spacecraft and rocket architectures and designs could be the work a one person or a few. For example, Max Faget, was able to architect the first single person US spacecraft, develop the design and maintain it though to the successful launches of the Mercury program. In 1965 he published "Manned Space Flight," a small 165 page book that laid out the fundamentals of the architecture of the Apollo program. But as the systems have grown more complex, both technically and programmatically, the architecture and supporting processes have needed to adapt. Improving the content, understanding, communication, implementation and sustainability of mission architectures is a primary function and challenge of systems engineering, especially for ones as complex as human spaceflight.
There are many and sometimes conflicting architectural drivers for human spaceflight systems but the primary ones are crew safety, performance and resources. For architectures to be successful they need to be constructed with and for sustained stakeholder engagement, understanding and support. Establishing better understanding of what and how to construct an architecture for human spaceflight, with long term viability in the NASA technical and programmatic environment, will benefit significantly from the lessons drawn from the Constellation Program.
DEFINITIONS/ABBREVIATIONS CEV
Crew Exploration Vehicle The Engineering Meetings Board has approved this paper for publication. It has successfully completed SAE's peer review process under the supervision of the session organizer. This process requires a minimum of three (3) reviews by industry experts. Positions and opinions advanced in this paper are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of SAE. The author is solely responsible for the content of the paper. 
CLV

Crew Launch Vehicle
CxP
Constellation Program
ESAS
Exploration Systems Architecture Study
EVA
Extravehicular Activity
LEO
Low Earth Orbit
LOC
Loss of crew
LOM
Loss of mission
SAE
